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Personal construct psychology can be read either as an attempt to understand people by appreciating how the 
world appears to them, or to explain their behaviour in terms of personal constructs that inhabit some inte-
rior Cartesian realm. In this article, I maintain that this understanding versus explanation distinction 
(Dilthey, 1988) is useful and helps us clarify the personal construct project. By examining the phenomenol-
ogical strengths of personal construct methods, we can approach an understanding of the person that appre-
ciates the complexity of the lived world. 
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UNDERSTANDING VERSUS EXPLANA-
TION 
 
It was Dilthey (1988) who first proposed a strong 
distinction between causal explanation and under-
standing. In the natural sciences, causal explana-
tions of natural phenomena are sought, ideally 
through the use of experiments where independ-
ent variables are manipulated and dependent vari-
ables subsequently measured. But Dilthey (1988) 
argued that the social sciences should not model 
themselves on the natural sciences. In the com-
plex lived world that we inhabit, we cannot al-
ways expect to find causal connections. Under-
standing human action is more like interpreting a 
text than explaining the movement of particles. In 
the interpretation of a text, we move back and 
forth between an examination of a word or and 
the sentence in which it is embedded. The sen-
tence is made up of words whose ambiguity is 
dispelled by their context. Similarly, we under-
stand sentences only when we read them in the 
broader contexts in which they themselves are 
embedded. Only then can we pick out say, a 
metaphoric or ironical sense intended. We move 
to and fro between part and whole to grasp the 
meaning in what has been termed a hermeneutic 
circle (Ihde, 1986). So, for example, we might 
read the word ‘groom’ as applied to children and 
realise that it is not being used either as a noun 
(one who looks after horses) in its literal sense as 
a verb (to comb or care for an animal, usually a 
horse). It is only in the context of the current so-
cietal anxiety about paedophilic strangers that we 
apprehend its metaphoric meaning, along with the 
menacing connotations. In the same way then, we 
make sense of human action by reading it in the 
context in which it occurs. So when I say ‘I un-
derstand why you did that’, I do not mean that we 
have access to your private thoughts and feelings. 
Instead, I mean that it makes some sense to me, 
given what I can see of the situation in which you 
appeared to be placed. A more refined under-
standing is achieved if and when I can appreciate 
exactly how things did appear to you: your con-
struction of events.  
Now one might argue, following Rorty 
(1982), that explanation is itself a type of under-
standing, and that the understanding versus ex-
planation dichotomy is too crude to capture the 
scientific venture. But for the personal construct 
theorist, any construct should be evaluated in 
terms of its utility. And I maintain that it is a use-
ful construct. In the area of personality, there is 
an ever increasing tendency towards a reduction-
ism that looks for causal explanation in either 
brain science or an interior Cartesian realm (Butt, 
2004). The rejection of causal explanation high-
lights the value of a science of personality that 
promotes an understanding based on the constru-
ing of the other’s processes of construction. 
Clearly, the psychology of personal constructs 
(Kelly, 1955) is one approach to personality that 
is firmly grounded in this type of understanding. 
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In this sense it is a phenomenological approach; 
one that is primarily interested in the way in 
which the world appears to people (Kelly, 1955, 
p. 42). Both phenomenology and the pragmatic 
tradition in which Kelly worked are firmly monist 
and not dualist (Merleau-Ponty, 1944/1962; 
Dewey, 1910/1993). Both are committed to un-
derstanding phenomena at the level at which they 
appear, avoiding both reductionism and recourse 
to a mind made up of different substance to the 
body. But although contemporary theorists see 
strong links between Kelly’s pragmatism and 
phenomenology (Warren 1998; Butt, 2003, 
2004), Kelly himself maintained a distance be-
tween his work and phenomenology (Kelly, 
1969a). Reading The Psychology of Personal 
Constructs, it is easy to think of personal con-
structs as personal cognitions, the property of a 
ghost in the machine (Ryle, 1949) that exist be-
hind and indeed power behaviour. In this article, I 
will argue that an understanding of people is best 
achieved by avoiding this sort of explanation. I 
will begin by examining personal construct the-
ory’s links with phenomenology. 
 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY  
 
Kelly (1969a) famously declared that PCT could 
not be subsumed under any other theoretical ap-
proach. In his 1955 work, he underlined the simi-
larities between PCT and what he termed ‘neo-
phenomenology’. But elsewhere, (Kelly, 1969b) 
he misunderstood phenomenology, mistaking it 
for a type of introspectionism. Holland (1977) 
points out that it was a very partial, selective 
reading of European phenomenologists that was 
taken up by American theorists Rogers and 
Maslow. It is likely that this was the only expo-
sure to phenomenology that Kelly had. Phenome-
nology was a methodology devised by Husserl in 
the early twentieth century, to overcome the same 
Cartesian dualisms that were targeted by pragma-
tism, the tradition in which Kelly wrote. For phe-
nomenologists, the dualisms person/world and 
self/other are dialectical dualities where focus on 
either pole misses the vitality of the relationship 
between them. Husserl developed Brentano’s 
concept of intentionality that refers to a correla-
tion between the person and the world, or con-
struct and event. There is no consciousness with-
out the world, and there is no ‘lived-world’ with-
out the person. Phenomenologists reject the idea 
that there is a real world (of events) behind the 
world of appearances (or construction) that we 
represent to ourselves in perception. Instead, all 
we have is the lived world’ – a psychology of 
personal constructs.  
‘Intention’ emphasises that we are always 
conscious of something. We cannot experience 
desire unless it is desire for something, fear 
unless it is of something, thought unless it is 
about something. We are intimately connected or 
correlated with the world. Husserl’s vocabulary 
of noema and noesis (world and the way it is ex-
perienced) translates approximately into Kelly’s 
‘events’ and ‘constructs’. There is a real world of 
events beyond our comprehension, one that 
would exist if humankind had never graced the 
surface of the earth. But all we can know is the 
lived world, our construction of it. Phenomenol-
ogical reflection is not to be equated with intro-
spection, a subjective mentalistic exercise that 
examines internal mental representations of a real 
external world (Ihde, 1986). Instead, this reflec-
tion, or phenomenological reduction, attempts to 
get beyond our natural ways of seeing, our taken-
for-granted assumptions, in a return “to the things 
themselves!” (Husserl; cited in Ihde, 1986, p. 29). 
So the reduction, far from being an examination 
of the contents of the mind, is an exhortation to 
stand back, and put aside our habitual construc-
tions in a fresh look at the world of events. A 
close and fresh look at events always reveals 
more than is apparent from our ‘natural attitude’ - 
that collection of folk wisdoms and assumptions 
that make up the social reality that pre-dates each 
of us as individuals. Events will bear many more 
constructions than are grasped immediately. This 
clearly parallels Kelly’s philosophical position 
(derived from Dewey, 1993) of constructive al-
ternativism.  
However, although Husserl addressed both the 
subject/object and the self/other, dualism, he was 
less exercised by that of mind/body. He was con-
sidered by those who followed him – Heidegger, 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty - to have privileged 
reason with his proposal of a transcendental ego, 
an ‘I’ that in some way extracted itself from the 
intentional correlation of event/construct. For 
Husserl it was as though the intellect preceded the 
social and physical world. It is this ego that re-
flects on experience, or construction, and makes 
further sense of it (Ihde, 1986). The existential 
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phenomenologists demoted this transcendental 
ego, emphasising our essential being in the world 
Heidegger, 1927), or the inevitable perspectival 
status of our constructions, resulting from our 
embodied nature (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). For 
these existentialists, the reflections of the ego are 
the last development in the event-construction-
construer structure. Event and construction are 
inextricably inter-twined; this intentional correla-
tion denies a separation of knower and known. 
For Kvale (1992), Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on 
our perspectival construing foreshadows the de-
velopment of post-modern thought. We are fun-
damentally pre-reflective beings, who often re-
port feeling most alive when lost in a task. Ihde 
(1986: 47) paraphrases Merleau-Ponty – “I am 
outside myself in the world of my project”. It be-
comes apparent that this mirrors Mead’s view that 
humankind is primarily impulsive and only con-
scious and reflective through interaction. In 
Kelly’s vocabulary, we construe in action, we do 
not possess constructs. 
For the existential phenomenologists, exis-
tence precedes essence (Sartre, 1958). This means 
that the person as a reflective consciousness is the 
last development in the intentional correlation. 
We are unable to adopt a privileged intellectual 
high ground, as our projects are primarily existen-
tial and interpersonal, rather than intellectual. 
Dewey’s and Kelly’s view of the person as self-
inventing is clearly similar to Sartre’s, although 
Kelly’s ambiguity about core structure (Butt, Burr 
& Epting, 1997) might be seen as placing him 
between transcendental and existential phenome-
nology. Perhaps following Dewey (See Mounce, 
1997), he seems reluctant to give up the idea of a 
unitary core self, while at the same time acknowl-
edging its invented, constructed status. Existen-
tialists see personal integrity as an achievement, 
rather than a given. The concept ‘existence’ em-
phasises our inter-subjectivity, the commonality 
of our construing. 
The world of events will not bear just any con-
struction; the world exhibits a resistance to our 
perception of it (Merleau Ponty, 1944/1962). We 
certainly cannot decide to see it in any way that 
we want, as the Gestalt figures demonstrate in 
visual perception; our purposes and our embodied 
nature limit what we can make of things. Our pro-
jects in the world are primarily practical (existen-
tial) and not intellectual. Our constructions are 
both personal and social, but also limited to what 
is ‘afforded’ (Gibson, 1979) by the world of 
events. Nevertheless, Ihde (1986) convincingly 
demonstrates that there are many more ways to 
see the Necker cube than the two inversions men-
tioned in the orthodox psychology of perception. 
The educated eye, much like the educated palate 
of the wine-connoisseur, is able to detect many 
non-normative perceptions. Using hermeneutic 
techniques implied by the phenomenological re-
duction, the viewer is able to stand back from 
‘sedimented’ constructions. In this way, the world 
is both found and made, discovered and invented.  
Merleau-Ponty (1962) distinguished between 
what he termed ‘objective thought’ and the ‘lived 
world’ (See Hammond, Howarth & Keat, 1991). 
Objective thought pervades the natural attitude of 
naïve realism. It maintains a clear separation of 
subject and object, and proposes that the world 
consists of separate objects whose dimensions 
and properties can ultimately be known and 
measured. Because these objects exist independ-
ently of each other, ‘external relations’, that is, 
causal relations exist between them. So the pres-
sure, volume and temperature of a gas can be 
thought of as ‘external’ to each other, and 
Boyle’s law tells us how to estimate one property 
accurately if we have knowledge of the other two. 
But unfortunately, the lived world is messier than 
this; everything in the lived world is ambiguous, 
open to interpretation. Psychological entities like 
thought, emotion and behaviour are not separate 
from each other. Historically, psychologists have 
separated the person into these different faculties, 
but our experience tells us that how we think, feel 
and act is intimately related. Therefore, ‘internal 
relations’ apply, where one feature of the lived 
world cannot be specified without implying the 
others. When I wave enthusiastically at a friend, 
it is not because of a feeling of warmth and 
friendliness, and my feelings are not caused by a 
cognitive construction of friend/enemy along 
which the person is placed. Friendliness is the 
whole configuration. 
Objective thought has proved useful in the 
natural sciences, where it made possible the type 
of causal explanation so often sought after in the 
psychology of personality. If we conceive of con-
structs as personal cognitions that are responsible 
for the way we act, we bring objective thought to 
bear. If, on the other hand, we see constructs as 
embedded in action itself (Butt, 1998), they lose 
their power of causal explanation. One way of 
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understanding the two readings is to see them as 
occupying the two poles of the lived 
world/objective thought construct. 
 
 
PCT AND OBJECTIVE THOUGHT 
 
I have argues that the person in existential phe-
nomenology is certainly not that straw man imag-
ined by Kelly (1969b), living in a world of 
dreams and unconnected to reality. But neither is 
it the person of naïve realism, who is in contact 
with the real world via their senses and represents 
this reality in an internal cognitive space. How-
ever, Kelly famously championed the ‘person as 
scientist’, a person primarily in the business of 
prediction and control. PCT can be read as both a 
somewhat positivistic cognitive theory, as well as 
a phenomenological approach. Kelly paid tribute 
to Dewey, recognising that in many respects the 
psychology of personal constructs reflects 
Dewey’s pragmatism. Like Dewey, he disliked 
Cartesian dualism (1955, 872). But elsewhere 
(1955, p. 17) he was less committed to monism. 
In this enigmatic passage he sounds as though he 
has swallowed a philosophical dictionary:  
Ontologically, our position is identifiable as a 
form of monism, although in view of the many 
complex varieties of ontology, the differentiation 
of its monistic form from its pluralistic aspects is 
hardly worth the effort. If it is a monism, it is a 
substantival monism that we are talking about; 
yet it is neutral, and, like Spinoza, we are pre-
pared to apply attributive pluralism to the sub-
stance whenever our purposes might be served 
thereby. (1955, p. 17. Italics in the original), 
Perhaps the uncharacteristically pompous tone 
adopted here merely indicates that Kelly knew 
that he was straying out of his philosophical 
depth, and felt the need to shore up what he was 
saying with some big words and names. But what 
was he saying? It is not at all clear, but we can 
perhaps get some indication from the direction he 
takes in the next section of his chapter on con-
structive alternativism. Here, he says that: 
“Whether a theory is called ‘psychological’, 
physiological’ or ‘sociological’ probably depends 
upon its original focus of convenience” (p. 18). 
As he had argued in his Fundamental Postulate, 
there are not events (for example, like emotions) 
that belong exclusively in these different realms, 
only events that can be construed physiologically, 
psychologically or sociologically. Presumably 
then, this is ‘attributive pluralism’; another phrase 
for constructive alternativism. But perhaps also, 
Kelly wanted to leave the door open for explana-
tion is dualist terms. The vocabulary of ‘construct 
systems’, ‘loosening and tightening’ and ‘con-
striction and dilation’ does, after all, conjure up 
images of cognitive structures with causal con-
nections to surface behaviour.  
So PCT is open to a reading that implicitly 
rests on the natural attitude of dualism, and more-
over, on the causal explanations that inhabit the 
objective thought of the natural sciences. This 
assumes the existence of a construct system 
within the person which is the cause of behav-
iour. PCT’s methodology can be seen as provid-
ing a sort of psychic X-ray, in which an individ-
ual’s system of internal constructs is revealed and 
can then be the focus of therapeutic attention. 
When the construct system is modified, behav-
iour will right itself in its wake. The natural atti-
tude of today leads us to incorporate a dualism 
that sees minds inside bodies and constructs be-
hind behaviour. When practitioners and academ-
ics read PCT, they are likely to interpret it within 
this framework, and much of the published work 
in the field demonstrates this. Science is, after all, 
the most valued enterprise as we enter the new 
millennium, and both status and material re-
sources flow towards its practitioners. The public 
wants psychologists to be able to tell them why 
people think, feel and act as they do, what moti-
vates serial killers, psychopaths and fascist dicta-
tors. People want to know exactly how traumas 
impact on them, and what the causal relationship 
is between childhood experience and adult life. 
The prizes are awarded for being able to success-
fully profile offenders, predict behaviour and ex-
plain neurotic misery. There are few for under-
standing the life worlds of others, aiming to in-
terpret their actions. 
Merleau-Ponty (1941/1983) saw Gestalt psy-
chology and psychoanalysis as the most promis-
ing psychologies of his day. Both pick out de-
tailed and important aspects of the lifeworld and 
both can be read phenomenologically. Yet both 
fell under the spell of objective thought, looking 
for brain states that explain perception, or child-
hood experiences that cause adult neurosis. The 
English translation of Freud translated the Ger-
man it (Es), I (Ich) and over-I (Über-Ich) as id, 
ego and superego. The Latin terms transform 
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ways of experiencing the self into structures and 
entities within the person. Freud’s phenomenol-
ogical insights were striking, but he wanted to be 
recognised as a scientist. Merleau-Ponty’s project 
was to rescue the insights of these theories; to 
interpret them in terms of the lived world rather 
than objective thought. 
And Kelly also wrote in two voices. He cele-
brated scientific endeavour in psychology, indeed 
recommended the person as scientist as a meta-
phor that empowered the person. This can locate 
PCT in the camp of the natural sciences where 
causal explanations are sought within the individ-
ual for his or her behaviour. ‘Constructs’ are seen 
as entities that inhabit the individual rather than 
construing as a process that goes on primarily 
between them. Yet Kelly also saw the person as 
defying description and categorisation, was scep-
tical about laws in psychology, and doubted the 
value of sequential explanation. Even in his Fun-
damental Postulate, he refused to talk of cogni-
tion, affect and behaviour, preferring to consider 
‘a person’s processes’ in an implicit acknowl-
edgement of the internal relations that obtain 
here. It is this latter voice that constitutes a phe-
nomenological interpretation (or, as Chiari & 
Nuzzo [1996] term it a ‘hermeneutic’ constructiv-
ism). Just as Merleau-Ponty’s thought may be 
drawn on to achieve a different reading of Gestalt 
Psychology and Psychoanalysis, so it can help us 
see PCT as a methodology for understanding the 
lived world. 
 
 
PCT AND THE LIVED WORLD 
 
The lived world is ambiguous 
 
In his 1955 work, Kelly maintained a separation 
of events in the real world, and our individual 
constructions of them. This can be seen as a 
Kantian position, distinguishing between 
noumena and phenomena. Nevertheless, it is the 
alternative constructions that the personal con-
struct psychologist has to work with. In his later 
work, Kelly (1969c) further emphasised this, 
claiming that he was ‘no longer a realist’ in the 
sense that the psychotherapist has to work not 
with what has happened to clients, but how they 
interpret it; “There is nothing so obvious that its 
appearance is not altered when it is seen in a dif-
ferent light” (Kelly, 1969c, p.225). His advocat-
ing of the credulous approach precisely mirrors 
Husserl’s phenomenological attitude in contrast 
to the natural attitude. The phenomenological 
attitude is one of openness to new possibilities 
and constructions. Ihde (1986) outlines the 
method, or phenomenological reduction, that fa-
cilitates this attitude: 
1. Bracketing - the analyst attempts to bracket off 
their preconceptions in understanding phenom-
ena. 
2. Phenomenological description - phenomena are 
described, but causal explanation is avoided. 
3. Horizontalization - No assumptions about rela-
tive importance of phenomena are made. 
 
We can clearly see Kelly’s (1955) ‘credulous ap-
proach’ in these rules. Clients’ descriptions of 
their experience will be couched in terms of their 
construct systems; the relationships between their 
dimensions of meaning. The therapist must 
bracket off any impulse to rush to explanation 
based on his or her system. Careful listening is 
required. The credulous approach is the phe-
nomenological attitude. Kelly insisted that the 
credulous approach does not imply that the thera-
pist should be captured by the client’s construc-
tion. Instead, he or she should be able to subsume 
it, recognising it as one valid formulation. In phe-
nomenological terms, it is this merging of hori-
zons that enables intersubjectivity to emerge. In 
everyday life, our engagement with the world is 
primarily pre-reflective; out in front of what we 
can say about it, but nonetheless intentional. In 
psychotherapy, the therapist helps clients reflect 
on their intentionality in a hope that this produces 
increased agency and power of choice. 
PCT offers us a range of extraordinarily pow-
erful techniques for helping people to spell out 
their intentionality. Other broadly phenomenol-
ogical approaches rely exclusively on lengthy 
interviews for this purpose (See Moustakas, 
1994). The problem is always how the inter-
viewer manages to bracket off his or her interpre-
tations from those of the interviewee. Generally 
this is achieved through two strategies: a recogni-
tion of this danger is itself seen as a safeguard, 
and interpretations are always shared with the 
interviewee, allowing for his or her meanings to 
predominate. Kellians have always recognised the 
importance of reflexivity, but more importantly, 
their techniques guarantee fewer projections on 
the part of the therapist/interviewer. So in ladder-
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ing, it is clients who traces paths through their 
construct systems, and in the computer analysis 
of grids, construct and element constellations that 
emerge may be as much a surprise to either party. 
In his extraordinarily detailed suggestions for 
analysis of self-characterizations, Kelly (1955) 
lists many strategies for operationalizing the 
credulous approach. PCT techniques therefore 
offer truly innovative ways of extending the phe-
nomenological attitude. 
 
 
In the lived world, internal relations apply 
 
In his fundamental postulate, Kelly refused to talk 
of thought, feeling and action, but instead insists 
on referring to a ‘person’s processes’. Construing 
is not just a cognitive affair, but is internally re-
lated to feeling and action. There is no causal re-
lationship between separate human faculties. We 
should think of construing as occurring in action, 
and not behind it. People do not always deliberate 
on what they are doing. Nevertheless, their action 
is intentional; as the choice corollary suggests, 
what is important is what they might have done, 
but did not (1969c). In his ‘personal construct 
analysis’ of the Eden myth, Kelly discusses it in 
terms of three choices that are entailed. These are 
companionship-loneliness, innocence-knowledge, 
and good-evil. There is an emphasis of constructs 
as relating to action. There is a shift in the em-
phasis on the meaning of the ‘personal construct’, 
stressing choice: 
“... a construct is at heart a black and 
white affair, rather than a scale of grays. 
Indeed, it is precisely because constructs 
do comprise pairs of sharply drawn con-
tradistinctions that they enable man to 
make his choices, and get on with the hu-
man enterprise”. (Kelly, 1969b. p10) 
The model of humankind is ‘the person in mo-
tion’, being carries along in the stream of life, 
making choices as they present themselves pre-
reflectively. Constructs then, are not to be thought 
of as personal cognitions in any way causing be-
haviour, but are the configuration of thought, 
feeling and action, intentionally directed through 
our projects in the world. 
Kelly, like Merleau-Ponty, recognised that in-
ternal relationships existed not only within the 
person, so to speak, but between the person and 
the world. In his last writing (Kelly, 1969b), he 
rejected what he called ‘sequential explanation’, 
external causal relationships between events and 
construing. Behaviour is “man’s independent 
variable” (p. 36). This may be seen as over-
stating individual agency, but is surely at least an 
empowering heuristic for a clinician whose task 
is to help individuals to reconstrue their lives 
(which is, after all, the focus of convenience of 
PCT). But certainly Kelly was moving towards 
what phenomenologists advocate: describing, 
contextualizing and understanding action rather 
than explaining it: “Explanation, in a humanistic 
or psychological sense seems to me to be a matter 
of seeing where something fits into a sequence.” 
(p. 44).  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
At the beginning of the new century, we fre-
quently hear that the public has lost its faith in 
science, because it has failed to deliver on its 
promises. One reason for any loss of faith in psy-
chology as a science might be the over-extension 
of objective thought into the lived world. Psy-
chologists have wanted to predict and control to 
an unrealistic extent. Objective thought leads us 
to separate person from world and mind from 
body, then to look for external relationships be-
tween them. Interestingly, Dewey cautioned 
against this nearly a century ago: 
“The question of integration of the 
mind/body in action is the most practical of 
all questions we can ask of our civilisation. 
Until this integration is effected in the only 
place where it can be carried out, in action 
itself we shall continue to live in a society 
in which a soulless and heartless material-
ism is compensated for by a soulful but fu-
tile idealism and spiritualism.” (Dewey, 
1910/1993, p. 304) 
We can now see an even more irrational split be-
tween this materialism and idealism. While bio-
logical psychologists seem to posit a genetic ex-
planation for just about anything, in everyday life 
people also draw on mysticism to understand 
themselves, albeit in a causal manner. It is not 
uncommon to find intelligent individuals identi-
fying themselves by their star sign, or explaining 
behaviour in terms of energy or karma.  
Dewey’s pragmatism resonates with phe-
nomenology in its call to focus on action. This 
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focus leads us to recognise that we cannot sepa-
rate out thought, feeling and behaviour, any more 
than we can see a clear boundary between the 
personal and the social world. When personal 
construct psychologists accept the ambiguity of 
the lived world, they can contribute significantly 
to the understanding of it, while at the same time 
foregoing the inevitably disappointing project of 
trying to explain it mechanistically. 
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